[1]See U.S. Department of Justice Complaint [hereinafter DOJ Complaint] at 31-34, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) [hereinafter Microsoft]; State Attorneys General Complaint [hereinafter State's Complaint], State of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D. D.C.)[hereinafter Vacco].
[2]See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
[3]See, e.g., American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, The Amgen Forum: The Law And Economics of U.S. v. Microsoft, Federal News Service, June 18, 1998, available in LEXIS, Commercial and Trade Speeches or Conferences Library.
[4]A survey of 639 leading software firms puts Microsoft at 8.58% of global software sales, well behind IBM's 12.38%. International Data Corp., Worldwide Software Revenues, 1995-1996 (1997).
[5]See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11; Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, in Microsoft [hereinafter Fisher Declaration]; Declaration of David S. Sibley, in Microsoft[hereinafter Sibley Declaration]; Declaration of Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, in State's Complaint.
[6]Complainants define a narrowly drawn market in operating systems for personal computers as the arena in which Microsoft allegedly exercises monopoly power and ask that the court declares that the relevant market for antitrust analysis. See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
[7]See id.
[8]See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188-93 (1980); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 92 (1902); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
[9]See discussion infra, text and notes at notes -.
[10]Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 330-31 (R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
[11]See Ronald A. Cass & Eli M. Noam, The Economics and Politics of Trade in Services: A United States Perspective, in Rules for Free International Trade in Services 43, 45, 46-49 (Daniel Friedmann & Ernest Joachim Mestmäcker eds., Nomos Verlagsgesellchaft 1990).
[12]See Marvin H. Kosters, An Overview of Changing Wage Patterns in the Labor Market, in Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down? 1, 28-31 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Marvin H. Kosters eds., 1994).
[13]U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
[14]See The Federalist, No. 43 (James Madison).
[15]For an extended discussion of the English and American authorities, See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 Wayne L. Rev. 1119 (1983). See also Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties: Cases and Materials 1-5 (4th ed. 1993).
[16] Stat. 124. See also Edmund W. Kitch & Harvey S. Perlman, Legal Regulation of the Competitive Process 620 (2d ed. 1979).
[17]See id. at 621 (describing statutes of 1802, 1831, 1856, 1865, and 1870 amending copyright law); See also Gorman & Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 7-8.
[18]See General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
[19]Kitch & Perlman, supra note 17, at 622.
[20] U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733 (1976); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983); Ginsburg & Gorman, supra note 15, at 685, 694-95.
[21]See Pub. L. 96-517, 17 U.S.C. § 101. The rationale for the 1980 amendments was provided in National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Rept.].
[22]See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976).
[23]See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1993). But see Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing limits on scope of protection).
[24]There are competing explanations of the organizing principle behind the scope of patent protection. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305 (1992); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Rewards to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561 (1971); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803 (1988).
[25]In patent law, novelty is a separate requirement from nonobviousness, but the term novelty is used here to embody both requirements.
[26]See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989).
[27]See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (1991).
[28]See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). See also Hirshleifer, supra note 24; Kitch, supra note 24; Stan J. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 945 (1985).
[29]See Besen & Raskind, supra note 27; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev.1600 (1982) [hereinafter Betamax]; Hirshleifer, supra note 24; Landes & Posner, supra note 26.
[30]E.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
[31]E.g., Stephen J. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970); Grady & Alexander, supra note 24; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and "Encouragement" Theory, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter Challenges]; Landes & Posner, supra note 26; Robert P. Merges & Richard Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of Patent Scope Decisions, in Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1992); Tom Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 Hamline L. Rev. 262 (1989).
[32]See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 26, at 2310 n.1; Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter Manifesto]; John T. Soma, et al., Minimizing Reverse Engineering: Sample Language for Dual United States and European Union Software Licenses, 24 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 145, 147-51 (1995).
[33]Source code can be translated into object code through a compiler (which generally is a device located outside the computer on which the program will run). The compilation process produces a translation of the source code that can be configured to execute instructions at optimum speed. An alternative to compilation is to use an interpreter (which generally is located inside the computer that is running a program) to translate source code into object code on a line-by-line or instruction-by-instruction basis. The interpreter does not retain memory of prior instructions, so that, unlike with a compiled program, repeated functions must be explained to the computer in full detail each time.
[34]See discussion and citations in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Finding a Balance: Computer Software, Intellectual Property, and the Challenge of Technological Change (Gov't Printing Office 1992) [hereinafter OTA Rept.]; at 68-69, 130. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 978 (1993); Maureen O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 Duke L.J. 479, 484-85 n. 20 (1995); Samuelson, et al., Manifesto, supra note 32. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
[35]See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); CONTU Rept., supra note 21.
[36]See Pub. L. 96-517, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
[37]See Besen & Raskind, supra note 27; Betamax note 29; O'Rourke, supra note 34. See also Challenges, supra note 31, at 1356-58, 1368-70 (broad privilege consistent with common law property rights doctrine).
[38]See, e.g., Mark L. Gordon, Computer Software: Contracting for Distribution and Development 243-375 (1985); H. Ward Classen, Fundamentals of Software Licensing, 37 Idea 1 (1996).
[39]See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (declaring that blanket licenses used by BMI-like licenses used by the American Society of Composers and Publishers, ASCAP-are not per se illegal tying arrangements). In some instances, even the blanket license is too burdensome a mechanism. Those instances fall within the "fair use" exception. See Betamax, supra note 29.
[40]E.g., Classen, supra note 38; Thomas Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 Denver U. L. Rev. 577 (1994).
[41]E.g., Philip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive Software Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629 (1991).
[42]See Microsoft Accused, Economist, May 23, 1998, at 21, 22.
[43]See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 85-130 (1985).
[44]See O'Rourke, supra note 34.
[45]With apologies, "store" here is used as an anthropomorphism, standing as shorthand for the interests of those who own and operate the enterprise.
[46]See, e.g., Armen Alchian & William R. Allen, Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination, and Control 85-87 (1977); George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 5-15 (1968) [hereinafter Industry]; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 88-102 (1966) [hereinafter Price]; P. Diamond, Search Theory, in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information and Markets 271, 282-85 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., MacMillan 1989).
[47]See Alchian & Allen, supra note 46, at 185-86; Diamond, supra note 46.
[48]See generally William Baxter & Daniel Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 615 (1995).
[49]See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 19-20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
[50]See id.
[51]See, e.g., Stigler, Industry, supra note 46, at 14. The information problems presented by the typical market's bundling of goods also would exist (albeit in different form) for segregable goods. Alchian & Allen, supra note 46, at 110-15.
[52]But see Stigler, Industry, supra note 46, at 117-20 (explaining that departures from notions of perfect efficiency are ubiquitous so that efficiency truly should be understood not in terms of abstract ideal but instead in terms of ordinary market functions).
[53]See Alchian & Allen, supra note 46, at 85-87; Stigler, Price, supra note 46.
[54]Freidrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper & Row 1975) (1942).
[55]This definition looks only to allocative efficiency, not to other possible social goals.
[56]See John S. McGee, In Defense of Industrial Concentration 16-23 (1971); Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B. Laffer, The Number of Firms and Competition, in The Competitive Economy: Selected Readings 43, 45-47 (Yale Brozen ed., 1975).
[57]See William J. Baumol et al., Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 349-50 (rev. ed. 1988).
[58]See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44, 48-49 (1964) [hereinafter Oligopoly]. Although collusion is a major concern when few sellers occupy a market (and, merger considerations aside, tends to be the primary concern), actual collusion is not necessary to produce supra-competitive prices and sub-competitive output. See, e.g., Jean Tirole, A Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press 1988); Jonathan B. Baker, Symposium on Tacit Collusion, 38 Antitrust Bull. 1 (1993).
[59]See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 (1975).
[60]See, e.g., Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1198, 1221 (1983). The tendency of commentators to characterize markets for goods associated with intellectual property as monopolistic was noted by Professor Stephen Carter: "[C]ommentators constantly refer to intellectual property rights as monopolies-all right, limited monopolies-even though the typical proprietor lacks the market power (and often, as Edmund Kitch has noted, the incentive) to extract monopoly rents." Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 715, 717 (1993).
[61]See generally, Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers (1988); Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord & Tenant (1977).
[62]See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.§ 106 (1994); OTA Rept., supra note 34, at 185-86.
[63]See Gary Ink, Book Title Output and Average Prices: 1996 Final and 1997 Preliminary Figures, in The Bowker Annual: Library and Trade Book Almanac 521-22 (Dave Bogart ed., 1998).
[64]See Mark Feeney, High-Stakes Bookmaking; Huge Advances, Readership Slump Make '90s Publishing a Gamble, Bos. Globe, Dec. 10, 1997, at C1; Bob Hoover, Best Seller; Michael Crichton Strikes It Rich Before His Latest Book Hits the Stores, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 7, 1996, at D12; Doyle McManus, Gingrich Inks a Book Deal for $4 Million, L.A. Times, Dec. 23, 1994, at A1; Jeff Zaleski, The Grisham Business, Pub. Wkly., Jan. 19, 1998, at 248; Clancy Deal Worth $100 Million, Chi. Sun-Times, Sep. 8, 1997, at 32.
[65]Even in intensely competitive markets, those who control particularly valuable inputs-for example, especially fertile land-may earn returns above the norm.
[66]See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970) (exposing effects of information problem in market without intellectual property or other monopoly rights).
[67]See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 385; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271 (1986); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983).
[68]See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note ; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., Harvard Bus. School 1985); Carney, supra note 67; Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
[69]The one arena in which there is appreciable question about this assertion is the use of so-called "shrink-wrap" contracts with ultimate consumers of software. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); O'Rourke, supra note 34.
[70]Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, suggested that patentees enjoy a monopoly over their invention that includes the right to withhold a license to use it, making antitrust inquiry into that decision inapposite. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-21 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
[71]See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813 (1984) [hereinafter Intersection]; Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 793 (1988) [hereinafter Misuse]; William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L.J. 267 (1966); Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1599 (1990) [hereinafter Irrationality].
[72]See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
[73]See Kaplow, Intersection, supra note 71; Lemley, Irrationality, supra note 71.
[74]Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988).
[75]See Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Medical Ass'n., 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Merges, Misuse, supra note 71.
[76]See, e.g., Judge Posner's majority opinion in USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., supra note 71.
[77]See Vacco & Microsoft, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction.
[78]See Intersection, supra note 71(arguing that the scope for antitrust concerns depends on the gap between intellectual property laws' ambit and socially optimal protection for inventive activity).
[79]See, e.g., The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice Perspective (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995).
[80]See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, What Do Economists Think About Antitrust?: A Random Walk Down Pennsylvania Avenue, in McChesney & Shughart eds., id. , at 33, 36-61.
[81]See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (1976). See also Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (1993) (often supporting, but also condemning, antitrust doctrine).
[82]See, e.g., McChesney & Shughart eds., supra note 79.
[83]See, e.g., Bork, supra note 81, at 245, 288-98, 379-81; Don Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Inframarginal Consumers and the Per Se Legality of Vertical Restraints, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 137 (1988); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 28 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1988).
[84]See, e.g.., Baxter & Kessler, supra note 48, at 627 (arguing that confusion on this point traces to courts sometimes mistaking vertical relationships-those involving parties engaged in production of complements not substitutes-for horizontal relationships and vice versa); Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note 83; Klein & Murphy, supra note 83.
[85]See Williamson, supra note 43, at 85-130; see also Baxter & Kessler, supra note 48, at 620.
[86]Compare Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), with Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
[87]See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra note 86.
[88]See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., supra note 71.
[89]E.g., Microsoft, 1998 WL 327855 at *13-*19; Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542-44 (9th Cir. 1983); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); International Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1471-76 (D. N.J. 1984); ICL Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228, 230-34 (N.D. Cal 1978), 458 F. Supp 423, 439-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
[90]E.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988)+; WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982); Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980). These decisions are straightforward applications of U.S. intellectual property law, not European-style "moral right" determinations.
[91]See generally Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 Va. L. Rev. 257 (1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 177 (1985).
[92]This example of fruitless analysis is a long-time favorite of Professor James A. Henderson, Jr., who kindly has not sought copyright protection.
[93]When a user turns on a typical computer with a program such as Windows 98 installed, the computer will initially load and run a program that is part of the computer's basic input-output system (BIOS) to test the system hardware and look for additional routines in the system. The BIOS then turns control over to a program located in the "master boot record" of the disk drive being used to boot the system, and that program will load the operating system. Control then passes to the operating system, which goes through another sequence of locating and/or activating various hardware and software. The entire process commonly is referred to as the "boot-up" sequence.
[94]See George Gilder, Microcosm: The Quantum Revolution in Economics and Technology 166-68 (1989) (describing how progress is made in computing).
[95]George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981).
[96]See, e.g., Kenneth W. Clarkson, et al., Liquidated Damages Versus Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 351; Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1195 (1994).
[97]As noted earlier, it also flies in the face of decisions upholding copyright owners' control of modifications of their works and decisions upholding rights to integrate technologies free from judicial second-guessing.
[98]E.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 68.
[99]See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1977); Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1964); Richard Schmalensee, Advertising, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 34 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
[100]See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11; Fisher Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
[101]See Sibley Declaration, id. The license agreements between Microsoft and OEMs prohibit OEMs from altering the boot-up sequence for Windows. This has the effect of proscribing OEM use of the screen for other purposes (including advertising purposes) during the Windows boot-up, an effect that is allegedly anticompetitive. See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 32-34; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11; Fisher Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5. The license agreement does not, however, prohibit licensee-OEMs from using a different operating system prior to the inauguration of Windows operation; the Windows license agreement does not regulate what occurs during boot-up if an OEM chooses to use another system in addition to Windows to perform functions prior to starting or switching to Windows.
[102]For discussion of the peculiar realm of such concerns, see William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467 (1980).
[103]See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 32-34; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
[104]See Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
[105]Casual inspection of computers at two local stores revealed that many computers come pre-loaded with both Windows (including Internet Explorer) and Netscape Navigator.
[106]See Fisher Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5 .
[107]See Fisher Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
[108]See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and Static Inefficiencies?, in Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness., supra note 31, at 82, 86-95; Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in id., at 119, 123-32; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. et al., Business Restraints and the Clayton Act of 1914: Public- or Private-Interest Legislation?, in McChesney & Shughart, supra note 79, at 271-86; Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago's Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in id., at 323-40; Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart, The Unjoined Debate, in id., at 341-44; Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Lenses and the Uses of Transaction Cost Economics Reasoning, in Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness., supra note 31, at 137-58; Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 401 (1994).
[109]See, e.g., Bork, supra note 81, at 387-91.